Greek Philosophy and Mystery Cults. Reseña de Mirjam Engert Kotwick en Gnonon 2/92/2020

María José Martín-Velasco, María José García Blanco (Edd.): Greek Philosophy and

Mystery Cults. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2016. XII, 244 S.

The contributions collected in the volume ‘Greek Philosophy and Mystery Cults’ result from a meeting of the Iberian Society of Greek Philosophy that was held in May 2012. As stated in the preface, the «main aim of the Society’s meeting is to bring together experts with postgraduate students ... to create a fruitful interchange of ideas». Thus the contributions are the «work of writers

at different levels of advancement». Further, the volume intends to offer a «broad vision» of the relationship between Greek philosophy and mystery cults. In effect, the question of how Greek philosophy and mystery cults are connected and interrelated is not quite the topic that all contributions share and explore for different cases; rather, ‘Greek philosophy’ and ‘mystery cults’ together serve as a broad banner under which most of the chapters of this volume can be subsumed. Still, the volume aims to provide «a new approach to some of the most renowned Greek philosophers, highlighting the influence that cults such as Orphism, Dionysianism and the Eleusinian rites had on the formation of fundamental aspects of their thought».

The volume contains a brief preface (vii–xii), in which the editors María José Martín-Velasco and María José García Blanco present abstracts of all subsequent contributions. Five of the ten contributions focus on Plato and his engagement with mystery cults, one contribution looks at Euripides, one at Aristotle, one at Iamblichus, and two at Proclus (I will discuss them in this order, which is not the order they appear in the volume). The volume closes with an Index Locorum (pp. 233–244).

Francesc Casadesús’ contribution, ‘The Transformation of the Initiation Language of Mystery Religions into Philosophical Terminology’ (pp. 1–26), focuses mainly on how Plato adopts and adapts the terminology of mystery cults in his dialogues. The incorporation of mystery terminology into Stoic thought is treated briefly at the end. Casadesús’ specific aim is to show that Plato (and Stoic philosophers) uses mystery terminology to assimilate the process of reaching philosophical knowledge to the process of religious initiation.

After a brief survey on the divine status of wisdom in presocratic thought, Casadesús turns to Plato. He makes the following connections. Plato describes the process by which the immortal soul, being trapped in a mortal body, achieves divine wisdom (i.e. apprehends the Forms) in the terminology of the Orphic, Dionysian, and Eleusinian mystery religions. In the Myth of Er, Plato incorporates Orphic conceptions of memory and oblivion as they are preserved in the Orphic Gold tablets. In the Symposium, Diotima’s speech is structured as an initiation session, including the three steps of μύησις, τελετή, and ἐποπτεία (this last being the culminating sudden vision). This structure Casadesús sees to some extent present also in «the myth of the Cave» in the Republic. Casadesús closes with a brief look at the Stoic philosophers who present their philosophical discourse as religious teaching that closely resembles the path to initiation into the mysteries.

The contribution by António De Castro Caeiro (‘Escathological [sic] Myths in Plato’s Gorgias’, pp. 43–60) is not given in the form of a scholarly paper (no secondary sources are cited, for instance). Instead, it offers, on the basis of the author’s interpretation of Plato’s Gorgias, reflections on the topics of life and death, the soul, and the credo that «doing wrong is to be more carefully shunned than suffering it». The essay does not treat mystery cults and so it stands somewhat out in the given volume. The English of this piece is problematic and should have been revised by a native speaker.

María R. Gómez Iglesias’ ‘The Echoes of Eleusis: Love and Initiation in Platonic Philosophy’ (pp. 61–102) offers a lengthy discussion of the role of Eros (curiously referred to by the poetic form ἔρος throughout the paper) in the initiation to knowledge in Plato’s philosophy. Gómez understands Eros as a bridge between the human sphere and the divine that functions as a necessary «facilitator» of the initiation and as such makes knowledge possible. Her analysis works from Plato’s Phaedrus and Symposium and turns on Plato’s application of the model of the Eleusinian initiation process, which consists of several consecutive degrees, to the ascension to knowledge, which in both dialogues

happens through beauty and Eros. The knowledge of the good that occurs at the last step of the ascension is knowledge akin to that of oracles and prophecies and is beyond νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη. Gómez concludes that although Plato uses the terminology and structure of mystery cults he does not adapt their goals. Distancing herself from Riedweg’s view (1987),1 Gómez holds that Plato’s version of initiation is not soteriological and is not concerned with the attainment of immortality; rather, it is about knowledge «and unleashing the role of ἔρος, who inspires the lover and makes him ἔνθεος, capable of knowing beyond the knowable». The essay contains a large number of typos in both the Greek and the English.

Fidel Blanco Rodríguez investigates ‘The influence of Orphism in Plato’s Psychology and Eschatology’ (pp. 103–121). Blanco understands Orphism as an initiatory religion that «breaks with traditional religiousness» and whose three tenets about the soul are that it is an immortal, incorporeal divine entity, that it is held captive in the body, and that its liberation happens through ascetic purifications. Plato transposes and adjusts those ideas in his psychology and eschatological myths. In the Phaedo, the Orphic idea that the body is a tomb for the soul is turned into the view that it is a prison. The Orphic theory of transmigration becomes the basis of Plato’s epistemological conception of anamnesis. Finally, Plato elaborates Orphic ideas in his eschatological myth.

Blanco observes that Plato harshly criticizes «Orphic religion as a whole» and its representatives, but he concludes that Plato values positively the Orphic depreciation of the body, the necessity of purification (in philosophy rather than initiation) and salvation (through knowledge).

The contribution by Marco Antonio Santamaría Álvarez (pp. 205–231) may be called the highlight of the volume (‘Did Plato Know of the Orphic God Protogonos?’). Santamaría investigates whether Plato was familiar with the Orphic god Protogonos. First, he looks at evidence for the Orphic figure of Protogonos in classical and Hellenistic texts (e.g., a tablet from Thurii, i.e., OF 492, the Derveni Papyrus, and the ornithogony in Aristophanes’ Birds) on the basis of which he concludes (with M. L. West)1 that an Orphic Protogonos Theogony was available from about 500 BCE. Second, Santamaría argues that the Orphic god Protogonos inspired Plato repeatedly: The primitive double humans of Aristophanes’ speech in the Symposium show features parallel to Protogonos, namely, their androgyny, posterior position of their genitals, and their celestial origin. Santamaría also sees present a structural resemblance of unity – separation – reunification through Zeus/(Protogonos)-Eros in both

Aristophanes’ myth and the Orphic theogony. Santamaría further points to the Laws (715e–716a = OF 31 III), where Plato quotes two verses from the so called Orphic Hymn to Zeus. The passage clearly suggests that Plato was not only familiar with the verse he quotes but also with their original context including the figure Protogonos.

Ángela Navarro González (‘The Dionisism [sic] in the Bacchae: Megála kaì Phanerá’, pp. 187–204) looks at Dionysianism in Euripides’ Bacchae, while paying special attention to the conception of wisdom and how it is linked to piety. Here she is interested in the paradox or ambivalence that inheres in the worship of Dionysus: with the «Dionysiac evangelism» Euripides portrays a new kind of σοφία that rejects the sophistic notion of wisdom and leads to eudaimonia through piety toward the god. However, this wisdom has an irrational component that is so strong that it can shatter the very foundations of the Greek polis. Dionysian piety as depicted in the Bacchae entails a potential

for extreme violence and destruction.

Alberto Bernabé in ‘Aristotle and the Mysteries’ (pp. 27–42) poses the question: What is Aristotle’s attitude towards the mysteries? Bernabé sets up his inquiry with a brief overview of the forms and functions of ancient Greek mystery cults. He then draws evidence from the Problems to show that Aristotle was familiar with the ritual practice of what likely was part of the Orphic mysteries. According to Bernabé, Aristotle, in contrast to his teacher Plato, tries to explain enthusiasm and Bacchic possession scientifically and sees in it an altered state of mind. Bernabé then concentrates on what he calls «the most important evidence of Aristotle’s opinion of the mysteries». According to Fr. 15 Rose, Aristotle thinks that initiation is not about learning something, but about experiencing a change. Bernabé also contrasts Aristotle’s view with that of the Derveni author, who seems to hold learning and understanding as the key element of initiation, even if many initiators fail to provide them. Bernabé, then, presents evidence of other writers (Plutarch, Dio Chrysostom, and Pindar),

who also seem to see in the experience that the individual undergoes during the mysteries their most crucial aspect. In this respect, Aristotle’s assessment of the nature of initiation rites is in line with their view on the mysteries. Yet, Bernabé concludes, Aristotle does not consider the experience as in any way philosophically fruitful; in this assessment he differs from the Derveni author as welas from his teacher Plato.

María Jesús Hermoso Felix investigates how philosophy and theurgy coexist in Iamblichus’ thought (pp. 171–185). She rejects an interpretation according to which Iamblichus introduces theurgy as an answer to the weakness of the intellect, and instead sets out to offer an «exegetic framework» that does not presume in advance what specific meaning ‘philosophy’ and ‘theurgy’ have in Iamblichus. According to Hermoso, Iamblichus understands «true» Platonic philosophy as an «active itinerary» to free the soul from its passions so that it can contemplate beauty. Theurgy, as Hermoso points out, is a procedure parallel to true philosophy. Hermoso draws from De Mysteriis, where Iamblichus makes clear that theurgy is about liberating the soul from its passions and bringing it closer to the divine. Whereas philosophy leads to likeness to the divine through beauty, theurgy achieves the same result through the symbolic character of a ritual.

Antoni Bordoy Fernández looks at the role of Orphism in Proclus’ exegesis of Plato’s Timaeus (pp. 123–147). By focusing on the figure of the third demiurge, Bordoy intends to show that the authoritative status that Proclus attributes to Orpheus is based on the metaphysical and theological interpretation of Orphic texts rather than the acceptance of Orphism as a religious doctrine. For Proclus, Orphic myth can explain Plato’s philosophy presented in the Timaeus, as the formal elements and structure of this Platonic work point to a higher form of discourse. Bordoy shows that Proclus unlocks this superior form of discourse through Orphic doctrines.

Jesús De Garay (‘Mystery Religions and Philosophy in Proclus’, pp. 149–170) highlights connections between Proclus’ philosophy and «mystery religions», which in this chapter is mostly confined to Orphic myth. Connections can be seen, for instance, in that the One is hidden and unknowable, and is

only approachable through an initiatory process; and in that the One, being also the cause of matter and disorder, includes aspects that transcend intelligibility. De Garay explains that Proclus finds the latter aspect of the One expressed through the irrational and scandalous behavior of gods in the Orphic myth. In all, De Garay’s contribution offers a concise overview of Proclus’ philosophical system, but offers less than the title insinuates on the question of the role that mystery religion plays in it.

The volume offers varied sets of reflections on Greek philosophy and mystery cults. To look at ancient Greek philosophers from the perspective of mystery cults is certainly a worthwhile undertaking and will be welcome to scholars both of ancient Greek thought as well as Greek religion. The volume may be seen as part of a recent trend to study the religious underpinnings of ancient philosophy, even if this trend is not explicitly acknowledged in the volume (testimony of this trend are, e.g. the new Brill series ‘Ancient Philosophy & Religion’, with its first volume published in 20171 and the volume ‘Philosoph and Salvation in Greek Religion’, edited by V. Adluri in 2013,2 which overlaps in several instances with the volume under review, but is not mentioned in it).

In giving much attention to Orphism, the volume dovetails with the vigorous contemporary interest in Orphism. Moreover, the fact that the contributions are written in English makes the volume accessible to a wide audience. However, several chapters in this volume would have benefitted from more argumentative rigor and precision in the formulation of their theses. Further, the volume suffers from several, sometimes serious, formal defects. There is a lack of stylistic consistency among the contributions, especially in regard to Spanish terms that have not been brought into English (e.g. names appear as ‘Porphyry’and ‘Porfirio’, ‘Orpheus’ and ‘Orfeo’). Quite unfortunately, the volume is

marred by too many typos and errors (even, and repeatedly, in titles of contributions in the volume) as well as by some severe grammatical issues.

New York Mirjam Engert Kotwick

ssig.